China and Malaysia marked forty years of diplomatic relations in 2014. Despite the tragic loss in March that year of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 (which included 152 Chinese citizens on board), bilateral ties do not seem to have been too adversely affected. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak visited China in late May to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, during which the two sides signed a joint communiqué that formalized the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Malaysia and China. Economically, China has been Malaysia's largest trade partner since 2009, while Malaysia is China's sixth largest trade partner in the world and the largest among the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 2013 and 2014, public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center found Malaysians to be generally pro-China.
1 Politically, mutual visits by senior leaders are frequent, and the two countries have signed several important bilateral joint communiques or documents over the past four decades -in 1974, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2014 -that progressively upgraded the relationship to the present level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Notwithstanding the persistence of the South China Sea dispute -in which Malaysia and China have overlapping territorial and maritime boundary claims -Malaysia's policy towards China is generally recognized as being more accommodative and friendly than other Southeast Asian claimants, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. 2 However, there is one aspect of bilateral relations that appears to be growing at a much slower pace than economic and political ties: defence relations. The Sino-Malaysian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership envisages a closer defence relationship. Yet, little attention has been paid to Malaysia-China defence relations in the academic literature. 3 This article seeks to address this gap in the literature. It begins with a discussion on how a series of important bilateral documents have provided the foundations for Sino-Malaysian defence ties. It then moves on to examine in detail several areas of defence relations, including mutual visits by senior military and civilian officials, the exchange of military students, arms sales, defence and security dialogues and combined military exercises. The final section assesses the state of Malaysia-China defence ties. The major sources for this article are drawn from newspaper reports, or reports from online news portals, most of them from Malaysia and China. In addition, from March to May 2014, the author carried out semi-structured interviews with a Chinese defence official based in Kuala Lumpur and three Malaysian military officials who have had experiences in or knowledge of Malaysia-China defence ties. 
Background: Evolving Defence Ties
In 1974, Malaysia became the first ASEAN country to establish diplomatic ties with China. However, from the very beginning two issues continued to make Malaysian leaders wary of China. The first was the Chinese Communist Party's continued support for the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which was then waging a guerrilla war against the Malaysian government. The second issue was Beijing's policy towards Malaysia's ethnic Chinese community. Malaysia suspected China of treating overseas Chinese as their own nationals rather than citizens of the countries they had settled in. Therefore, as groundbreaking as the 1974 decision was, Malaysia did not immediately develop close ties with China. In fact it was not until China introduced economic reforms in 1978, and particularly the end of the CPM insurgency in 1989, that relations began to improve.
Nevertheless, even as old issues gradually disappeared, new issues began to emerge, especially the South China Sea dispute. While in the 1970s and 1980s Malaysia was much more suspicious and worried about Vietnamese claims and actions in the disputed maritime area, 5 in the late 1980s a combination of factors made Malaysia more aware and worried about China. These factors included the SinoSoviet rapprochement (which freed the Chinese navy from being preoccupied with the threat posed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet) and China's actions in the Johnson Reef South skirmish in 1988, which Malaysia watched anxiously as China defeated Vietnamese naval forces. 6 These developments prompted a well-known Malaysian security analyst to argue in 1991 that "Malaysia has, and will in the foreseeable future, regard China as its greatest threat in one form or another." 7 The then Malaysian Chief of Armed Forces, General Hashim Mohamed Ali, asserted in 1992 that "The Malaysian armed forces will fight to the end to protect the nation's sovereignty should there be any use of force by countries claiming ownership of the Spratly archipelago" and warned ASEAN to be "wary of China's military expansion". 8 Yet the early 1990s also saw the first tentative steps towards the establishment of defence ties between Malaysia and China. For Beijing, the main purpose of conducting military diplomacy with Malaysia, as well as with other Southeast Asian countries, was to persuade them that China did not pose a strategic threat, and that it was sincere about its pledge not to seek hegemony. In addition, China wanted to cultivate a positive image among regional armed forces. 9 For example, a Malaysian defence official wrote in a national newspaper after his visit to China as a guest of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that "there are strong indications that China is a benign power". 10 For Malaysia, engaging China in the defence sector provided an important opportunity to better understand Chinese thinking on military affairs pertaining to the region (and beyond), and occasionally, to explore the possibility of buying Chinese-made weapons systems. For these reasons, Malaysia and China have emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral defence ties. The 1999 Framework, which was a bilateral agreement aimed at improving long-term, institutionalized, and multifaceted cooperation between China and Malaysia, includes a clause stating that both countries should:
promote defence cooperation by facilitating the exchange of visits at various levels, including study visits, ship visits, training, exchange of information/intelligence, organizing of seminars, and undertaking mutual/beneficial research and development besides exchange of high ranking military officers. In the area of defence industry, both sides will encourage reciprocal visits by officials of the defence industry companies and organize exhibitions, seminars and workshops to explore the possibility of identifying joint or co-production projects. 11 In September 2005, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Defence Cooperation. 12 In the view of one Chinese official, this MOU "laid down the guiding thought and the basic principles (for bilateral defence relations), pushes bilateral military ties to a new phase, and results in the stable development (of the relationship)". 13 The MOU identifies several areas of defence cooperation, including, inter alia, the establishment of a security and defence consultation mechanism, officer training, high-level visits and exchange of information. In October 2013, during a visit to Malaysia, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed upgrading the two countries' Strategic Partnership into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. To that end, Xi put forward a five-point proposal that covered political, economic, science and technology, military and people-to-people exchanges.
14 To underscore the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, during a visit to China by Prime Minister Najib in May 2014, the two sides signed a new Joint Communique. Clause 22 states that:
both sides agreed to strengthen defence cooperation to enhance rapport, understanding and coordination between the defence agencies of China and Malaysia. The aforesaid cooperation may include exchange of high-level visits and meetings, joint exercises, 15 personnel training, setting up a hot-line for communication between the two Armed Forces, and exchange of port-call visits by both navies. Both countries also agreed to promote cooperation in defence science, technology and industry based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the field of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence. 16 From these official statements it can be seen that both countries made a firm commitment to strengthen defence ties. These documents cover a wide variety of cooperative activities. However, it will be shown that despite the stated will to strengthen defence ties, progress has been greatly uneven.
Mutual Visits of Senior Defence Officials
Although it was not reported at the time, the year 1991 marked the beginning of Sino-Malaysian defence ties when the Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces, General Yaacob bin Mohd Zain, travelled to China. The main purpose of his visit was to look into the possibility of procuring arms from China. 17 In April 1992, the PLA Deputy Chief of Staff, General Xu Xin, led a Chinese military delegation to Malaysia. This visit paved the way for reciprocal visits of the Malaysian and Chinese defence ministers. 18 In August 1992, then Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak (and since 2009 prime minister) visited China on the invitation of his Chinese counterpart General Qin Jiwei. Najib's visit signalled the willingness of both countries to move on from past suspicions arising from China's support for the CPM prior to 1989. Overall, the visit was intended to establish a relationship with China's military leaders, reduce suspicion and build greater trust and understanding, pave the way for further visits, and to assess the possibility of buying Chinese arms as Najib also toured some arms manufacturing firms. 19 In 1993 Najib's visit was reciprocated by General Chi Haotian, the first visit to Malaysia by a Chinese defence minister. 20 Chi provided assurances to his hosts that China would never seek regional hegemony and would not pursue an expansionist policy. He reiterated that the development of military-to-military ties between Malaysia and China would contribute to peace and stability in the region. During his visit, Chi toured a navy base as well as some munitions factories. On the issue of the South China Sea, Chi pledged that China would not use force to resolve the problem. To a certain extent, such reassurances paid off, at least in public. During Chi's visit, Najib's language during the customary press statement and interview was remarkably friendly towards China. Najib expressed his understanding of China's defence needs, that he did not perceive China's military modernization as a threat and that he also believed China did not seek to fill the strategic "vacuum" left by the reduction of US and the Russian forces following the end of the Cold War. He also dismissed Western media reports that portrayed the rise of China as a threat to regional stability. 21 Also, beginning in the early 1990s, Malaysia moved towards greater engagement with China, especially on the economic front, and the then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad publicly stated several times that China did not pose a threat to Malaysia's security. However, in practice Malaysia did not accept China's reassurances at face value, and continued to pursue a "hedging strategy" by modernizing its armed forces (particularly with South China Sea scenarios in mind) and strengthening defence ties with the United States. 22 These visits in the early 1990s formally established relations between the two militaries. Although largely symbolic, from then on defence relations gradually improved. In 1994, PLA Chief of Staff, General Zhang Wannian, became the highest ranking Chinese military officer to visit Malaysia. During his visit, Zhang reiterated China's position on the South China Sea during a meeting with Defence Minister Najib, and emphasized that essentially Malaysia and China had no substantial disputes. 23 In 1995, Chief of the PLA General Logistics Department, Lieutenant General Zhou Youliang, visited Malaysia, during which China offered to help develop Malaysia's defence industry. It was also during Zhou's visit that the idea of initiating military education exchanges was first mooted. 24 As noted earlier, in 1999 Malaysia and China signed the Framework for Future Bilateral Cooperation which included defence cooperation among the twelve items. Subsequently in the 2000s, the frequency of mutual visits by senior defence officials accelerated. Among these exchanges, the 2003 visit by Chinese Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie, and the 2005 visit by Najib, had real policy significance. Liang reportedly offered a "defence package" to his Malaysian counterpart Najib, who described the offer as "attractive". 25 The package contained various proposals, including the exchange of information, intelligence sharing, officer training, equipment procurement and combined military exercises. Liang's proposal formed the basis of the 2005 MOU on Defence Cooperation which, as mentioned above, promoted cooperation between the defence sectors of both countries, and was seen at that time as a major breakthrough in bilateral relations.
The signing of this document signified an increased level of trust between the two countries. Najib opined that Malaysia recognized that China was a rising economic and military power, and that it was in the common interests of both countries to develop a closer military relationship. 26 Also, as mentioned earlier, the MOU was signed in between the joint communiqués of 2004 and 2005 as the two countries moved to establish a Strategic Partnership. It was clear that these three documents significantly consolidated Malaysia-China defence ties.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, mutual visits by senior defence officials from Malaysia and China continued. Among these visits, the 2011 visit by then Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi to Beijing seemed to reinvigorate some of the items on the agenda of the 2005 MOU. In 2013, Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein undertook an important visit to China, during which he invited his Chinese counterpart General Chang Wanquan to visit the Malaysian naval base at Teluk Sepanngar in Sabah, and to jointly launch the establishment of direct contact between Malaysia's Naval Region Command 2 and the PLA-Navy South Sea Fleet Command.
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These were unprecedented moves by Malaysia to build greater trust and confidence with the Chinese military, as the aforementioned navy base and naval command are close to disputed atolls in the South China Sea. The two sides also agreed to conduct combined military exercises, and Hishammuddin visited the headquarters of the South Sea Fleet and the Guangzhou Military Region. 28 However, the proposed visit by Chang Wanquan to Sabah in 2014 was postponed, and has yet to take place. A chronology of exchange visits by senior defence officials from 1991 to 2014 is presented in Table 1 . Source: Author's compilation from various sources, including newspaper and online reports.
From Table 1 , it can be seen that over the past two decades there have been quite a number of mutual visits by senior defence officials from Malaysia and China. Almost every defence minister and senior military officer from each country has visited at least once, and almost every year there has been at least one militaryrelated delegation from either side. Of course, not all visits had substantive policy implications as many were symbolic goodwill visits. Nevertheless, such visits enhance confidence building and allow for the exchange of views and information. 29 
Exchange of Military Students
As mentioned earlier, the idea of exchanging military students was first mooted during the visit to Malaysia by the director of the PLA Logistics Department Lieutenant General Zhou Youliang in 1995. However, the implementation of a student exchange programme took almost a decade to realize. Only in the late 2000s did Malaysian military students start attending courses and programmes offered by Chinese military institutions of higher education, especially those which were designed to cater for foreign military officers. While the slow development can be interpreted as a symptom of strategic mistrust, the more likely reasons could be just institutional inertia or lack of sustained interests at the bureaucratic level despite high-level commitment. A former Malaysian defence attaché to China told the author that when he raised the issue of sending PLA officers to Malaysia, he was informed that few Chinese officers had expressed an interest. 30 Similarly, as Ian Storey has noted, military officers from Southeast Asian countries who have attended Chinese military institutions of higher education have not been overly impressed by the quality of the teaching, and a preference to attend military colleges in Western countries remains. 31 The most senior-level military institution in China is the National Defense University (NDU) in Beijing. Beginning in 2008-9, every year it has received three senior Malaysian officers, usually one from each of the three service branches, i.e. army, navy and air force. NDU sits at the apex of the PLA's vast system of higher education and admits senior PLA officers at the rank of colonel and above. Foreign students, including Malaysians, usually attend a college (Guofang daxue fangwu xueyuan), which is attached to NDU but separate from the main student body of Chinese officers. This defence college was created specifically to cater for foreign officers. In addition to NDU, and also starting in the late 2000s, annually one or two Malaysian military officers have studied at the PLA Army Command College in Nanjing, the PLA Navy Command College in Nanjing, and the PLA Air Force Command College in Beijing. The Army Command College trains mid-level PLA officers such as commanders, political commissars and staff officers from the battalion to divisional level, as well as foreign military officers. 32 Similarly, the Air Force Command College began a programme in March 2009 called "Sino-Foreign Joint Training" which allows Chinese and foreign officers to train together. 33 However, as Kevin Lanzit has pointed out, the foreign military students enrolled in this college are "segregated into a separate international seminar which limits their interaction with and exposure to Chinese field grade officers". 34 Finally, China has also offered some non-military courses (such as engineering and medicine) to Malaysian military students at some of its specialized military universities. Table 2 illustrates Malaysian military students' participation in Chinese institutions of higher education from 2008 to 2011. attended by more senior officers who undertake a one-year course leading to a Master's degree. In 2010 one PLA officer attended the course, but none thereafter. However, two PLA officers are scheduled to attend the course in 2015. 35 Other than these year-long programmes, some PLA officers have also attended short courses in Malaysia that run for only a few months. 36 No PLA officers have attended courses at the Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia (UPNM, the National Defence University of Malaysia). This is because UPNM is a comparatively lower-level institution that caters for junior-level officers, and China has not expressed an interest in sending officers to attend any of the courses on offer.
The exchange of military students is an important platform for exercising military "soft power". 37 Malaysian military students who attend courses in China are exposed to, and to a certain degree socialized into, the practices and norms that China wishes to convey to them. One Malaysian officer who went through one of the training courses in China conveyed to the author that he felt the Chinese favourably differentiated him from other foreign students so as to highlight the positive state of Malaysia-China relations. 38 A senior Chinese official who spoke to the author expressed satisfaction that Malaysian officers who had attended courses at NDU had formed an alumnus, and that he hoped these officers would play a key role in fostering Sino-Malaysian defence ties in the future.
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The Malaysia-China Arms Trade
According to an analyst from Aneka Bekal -a Malaysian company that has been at the forefront of importing Chinese weapons into Malaysia -the idea of sourcing military equipment from China first emerged in the late 1980s. 40 As mentioned earlier, this issue was on General Yaacob Zain's agenda when he visited China in 1991. In a press interview a few months after his historic visit to China, Defence Minister Najib indicated that Malaysia was open to Chinese arms firms marketing their products in Malaysia and competing with traditional (mainly Western) suppliers to the country's defence sector. 41 The possibility of Chinese arms sales to Malaysia was reiterated by Najib in 1993 after the visit by Defence Minister General Chi Haotian. 42 In August 1993, it was reported that an MOU had been signed between North China Industries Corporation (Norinco) -now one of the largest arms manufacturers in China -and Aneka Bekal, and witnessed by then Prime Minister Mahathir. 43 The MOU provided for the manufacture of armoured personnel carriers in Malaysia for sale in both domestic and foreign markets. The deal, together with Mahathir's earlier decision to purchase MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia, was interpreted as a deliberate snub to Western countries, who had been Malaysia's traditional arms suppliers. For reasons unknown, however, the deal did not materialize.
During PLA logistics director Zhou Youliang's visit to Malaysia in 1995, the two sides also discussed defence industry cooperation. Malaysia's then Deputy Defence Minister, Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan, reportedly said: "We believe this is one of the areas where we can learn from each other, although I must say that China's defence industry is more advanced than Malaysia's." 44 As noted earlier, the 1999 Framework for Future Bilateral Cooperation also promoted defence industry cooperation between the two countries. In September 2003, in his second stint as Defence Minister, Najib again reiterated Malaysia's openness to sourcing Chinese military hardware. 45 It was not until 2004, however, that the first arms deal between the two countries was concluded. China had offered to sell KS-1A medium-range anti-aircraft missiles to Malaysia, as well as a technology transfer programme to assemble FN-6 VSHORADS (Very Short Range Air Defence System). 46 Malaysia rejected the KS-1A but accepted the FN-6 offer. In July 2004, an MOU was signed by Malaysian companies SME Ordnance and Aneka Bekal and the Chinese state-owned China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) for the assembly and customization of FN-6. 47 The procurement of FN-6 was finally confirmed in June 2009 when Malaysia paid RM$23 million (US$6.6 million) for sixteen sets of FN-6s. The Royal Malaysian Army conducted two tests on the system in December 2009 and May 2010 respectively. Based on the assessment of these tests, the army has decided to replace some of the in-service British-made Starstreak VSHORADS with the FN-6. 49 In July 2010, the then Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi revealed that Malaysia was considering acquiring further Chinese-made weapons systems under the 10th Malaysian Plan: "The possibility for us to buy arms made by China is indisputable. This is because many military assets produced by [China] have the quality and performance on a par with other big powers." In addition, he revealed that China was willing to fulfill Malaysia's arms purchase conditions, including "technology transfer and counter trade programmes in the form of economy and training". 50 During his visit to China in 2011, Zahid also toured seven Chinese defence companies. In a press interview in 2012, he reiterated that Chinese weaponry was suitable for Malaysia's defence needs: the quality, technology transfer, price, and other aspects all met Malaysia's demands and conditions. 51 In April 2014, at the conclusion of the Defence Services Asia Exhibition and Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Defence Minister Hishammudin revealed that the government was drafting another MOU on defence cooperation with China. The MOU would institutionalize arms transfers between the two countries on a government-to-government basis.
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In May 2014, two developments occurred during Prime Minister Najib's visit to China. First, as mentioned earlier, the 2014 Joint Communique affirmed the signing of a government-to-government MOU on cooperation in defence, science and technology, and industry. Second, another MOU, between Aneka Bekal and Aerospace Long-March International Trade, was signed in which the latter offered the LY-80 Medium Range Surface to-Air Missile (MRSAM) Defence System (with a range of approximately 50 kilometres), including technology transfer. 53 If it materializes, this deal will be a major milestone in Malaysia-China defence cooperation.
For the Malaysian side, the arms trade with China is mostly handled through one of two Malaysian companies: Aneka Bekal and SME Ordnance. Aneka Bekal is a somewhat obscure company. First started in 1981 as Stein Industries (West Malaysia), it was renamed Aneka Bekal in 1990. Its core business appears to be the importation of Chinese weapons systems. An analyst from the company, Muhammad Hamzah, reportedly wrote a report for the Malaysian government in 2009 entitled, "The Potentiality of Procuring China's Weapons". 54 However, so far very little information related to this company or this report can be found publicly. Its partner, SME Ordnance, has a parent company, National Aerospace and Defence Industries (NADI). NADI's board of directors includes many senior retired Malaysian military officers, and it has a long history as a government-owned defence corporation. 55 In summary, while there has been much discussion between the two countries concerning defence industry cooperation and arms sales, there has been very little follow through. And notwithstanding the positive assessment of the FN-6, there are still doubts within the Malaysian armed forces about the quality of Chinese-manufactured weapons systems and a preference for Western hardware which is judged to be much superior.
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Defence and Security Consultations
In his five-point programme to update bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during his visit to Malaysia in 2013, President Xi specifically mentioned the utilization of the Defence and Security Consultation (DSC) mechanism. The first DSC was held in September 2012, while the second was held in May 2015. 57 The proposal to have a DSC was first mentioned in the 2005 MOU on Defence Cooperation, but it was only in 2011, during Defence Minister Zahid's visit to China, that a joint working group was established to work out the details.
In Chinese parlance, the DSC is conducted at the vice-ministerial level. The Chinese side is headed by the Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, while the Malaysian side is headed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence. The DSC is mainly a forum to exchange views on regional security issues (such as Malaysia seeking information on developments on the Korean Peninsula, China about political violence in the Southern Philippines etc.), explain their respective defence policies, discuss planning and preparations for joint activities and explore cooperation to tackle nontraditional security threats. 58 The DSC was originally envisioned to be an annual event, but in practice that has not been the case. 59 For example, no DSC was held in 2013 or 2014. In this sense, it is different from China's DSC with another Southeast Asian claimant state in the South China Sea, Vietnam, which has been an annual affair since 2010, but similar to China's DSC with the Philippines, which has an interval of several years between each round of DSC.
One reason which has been advanced why the DSC failed to take place in 2013 and 2014 is that 2013 was an election year in Malaysia, while 2014 was the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, during which many bilateral activities took place (as well as the MH370 incident), and that it was not convenient to hold a DSC. 60 A second DSC took place in May 2015 in Beijing, where the Malaysian delegation was represented by Defence Ministry Secretary General Abdul Rahim and received not only by the Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, General Sun Jianguo, but significantly also by the Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission, General Xu Qiliang. 61 It was significant in the sense that while China's DSC with Malaysia is designated at a vice-ministerial level, General Xu represents the Central Military Commission, China's highest military decision-making body. The May 2015 DSC took place during a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea due to Chinese reclamation activities on some of the features under its control. However, these features are not claimed by Malaysia.
Combined Military Exercises
China first proposed combined exercises with Malaysia in 2003 as part of its "defence package" but Malaysia was not very enthusiastic. Although Defence Minister Najib was generally supportive of strengthening Sino-Malaysian defence ties, he suggested that Malaysia was not yet ready for combined exercises with China.
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The idea of combined exercises was raised again at the 2012 DSC. Subsequently, in October 2013, during Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein's visit to China, it was announced that the two countries would hold their first combined exercise in 2014. 63 The exercise, codenamed "Peace and Friendship 2014", was held in December 2014 at the Joint Warfare Centre in Kuala Lumpur. 64 The five-day event was a Table-Top Exercise (TTX) involving simulation scenarios and seminar discussions. TTXs are generally considered the first step towards a field exercise. Twenty personnel from the Malaysian Armed Forces and twenty-one PLA personnel participated. Over five days, the TTX focused on nontraditional security issues, as well as combined naval escorts, search and rescue, and humanitarian and disaster relief. 65 The TTX was a modest first step. A field tactical exercise is scheduled to take place in the latter part of 2015.
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Assessing Malaysia-China Defence Relations
Since the early 1990s, China has gradually increased its defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia, either multilaterally through participation in ASEAN security institutions and frameworks, or bilaterally with the ten member states. Viewed in this context, the Malaysia-China defence relationship does not appear to be particularly exceptional. For example, before Malaysia started to exchange military delegations with China in the 1990s, Thailand had been doing this quite extensively since the 1980s. 67 Before Malaysia and China signed the 2005 Defence Cooperation MOU, at least four other ASEAN countries -Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia -had already signed similar agreements with China. In terms of arms sales, China's arms transfers to Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Timor-Leste have been higher than with Malaysia. 68 Malaysia was also something of a latecomer in establishing a DSC with China. Globally China has established DSC mechanisms with twenty-three countries, 69 including seven ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos and Brunei are the only three members that do not conduct defence talks with China). Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia all conducted combined military exercises with China before Malaysia. And while mutual exchange visits of senior defence officials between Malaysia and China appear to be quite extensive, Malaysia lags behind some of its fellow ASEAN members. 70 Malaysia's defence relations with the United States -the presumed principal competitor of China -are significantly stronger than those with China. Malaysia has had a defence exchange programme with the United States since 1982. 71 Paul W. Jones, the US ambassador to Malaysia from 2010 to 2013, noted in a speech that:
We have an active schedule of bilateral exercises -involving all services of the Malaysian Armed forces -that increase the capabilities of both of our countries. U.S. Navy ships visit Malaysian ports about 30 times a year, on routine deployments promoting peace, cooperation, and stability in the region. … The United States Government sponsors a professional development program that has sent more than 1,000 Malaysian military personnel to the U.S. for education and training over the last decade. 72 In 1984 Malaysia signed the Bilateral Training and Consultation Agreement with the United States, which was upgraded to an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement in 1994 (and renewed in 2005). These agreements formed the basis of the US-Malaysia military relationship, including extensive annual combined military exercises and regular port calls by US navy ships. 73 The US and Malaysian navies have undertaken annual exercises as part of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) which Malaysia has participated in since 1996, a year after the exercise programme started. 74 In 2014, when the PLA and RMAF held their first tabletop exercise, Malaysia and the United States conducted at least two combined exercises. In June 2014, the Royal Malaysian Air Force trained with the US Air Force (USAF) in a two-in-one exercise dubbed Cope Taufan/Teak Mint with combined personnel on both sides numbering around 1,000. What was notable in this exercise was the participation of the USAF's F-22 Raptor, America's most advanced fighter aircraft. 75 Two months later, the US Navy and Marines participated in another combined exercise with the RMAF off Sabah's east coast that focused on improving amphibious training, readiness and interoperability. 76 In late 2013, Malaysia announced that it planned to set up a Marine Corps, which was expected to rely heavily on the expertise provided by the US Marine Corps. 77 In addition, while China's arms sales to Malaysia have been relatively minor, the United States has been one of its largest arms suppliers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1990 to 2014, US arms transfers to Malaysia totalled $724 million, easily dwarfing the supply of $6.6 million of missile systems from China. 78 Comparatively speaking, therefore, Malaysia-China defence relations are not substantial or exceptional. The Malaysia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is based on a thriving trade and investment relationship, while defence and security ties are much less pronounced. This fact may lend credence to those who question whether there is a fundamental trust deficit between Malaysia and China because of the on-going and increasingly contentious South China Sea dispute. Citing leaked diplomatic cables through Wikileaks, a Malaysian security analyst has pointed out that, contrary to popular perceptions in both countries, but especially in Malaysia (as revealed by the Pew polls in recent years), Malaysia and China actually have not enjoyed close ties and that Malaysian defence planners do not fundamentally trust China. 79 The reported presence of Chinese naval ships at James Shoal, which lies within Malaysia's claimed 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in 2013 and 2014 sparked concern among Malaysian analysts and defence planners. 80 Malaysia's actions since then -such as the establishment of the Marine Corps, increased engagement with the US military and more assertive diplomatic protests against China, albeit in private -have led some analysts to speculate whether Malaysia is finally changing, or at least adjusting, its friendly policy towards China. Moreover, the lack of strong defence ties between Malaysia and China seems to suggest that their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership lacks breadth and depth.
This author, however, would caution against such an interpretation. While it is true that Malaysia adopts a "hedging" policy towards China, and in recent years has become more concerned about Beijing's activities in the South China Sea, the slow development of Malaysia-China defence ties does not substantially invalidate the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, nor can it serve as the sole indicator of how close the relationship is.
First, China's "partnership diplomacy" is not fundamentally hinged upon the development of military relations with its "partner". In developing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, China usually cultivates cooperative ties in many different areas (political, economic, cultural, people-to-people, defence, etc.) of a bilateral relationship, but it is fundamentally underpinned by economic cooperation. The strategic outcome that China wishes to achieve will be that these "partners", after having become more economically integrated with China, will be much less inclined to make a choice between China and the United States in an era in which Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia is growing. Therefore, China does not mind some sort of bifurcation in which countries are economically dependent on China while they are dependent for their security needs on the United States. Malaysia benefits greatly from this bifurcation pattern, as do many other countries in the Asia-Pacific region who are Comprehensive Strategic Partners of China even as they are allies and partners of the United States. In this sense, the Malaysia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is real and substantial, despite the ordinariness of bilateral defence ties. Second, the reason why defence ties have not developed as fast as other aspects of the bilateral relationship may not always be due to strategic distrust between the two countries. A bilateral defence relationship generally develops according to the needs and imperatives of each country. While it is true, as shown in the series of documents discussed at the beginning of this article, that the leaders of both countries have always been committed to developing stronger defence ties, this does not mean that it has always been the highest priority on their bilateral diplomatic agenda. Given that other issues concerning Malaysia-China relations are perhaps of more immediate concern -trade and investment being the obvious one, as they directly result in tangible economic benefits to the people of both countries -defence and security issues tend to be overtaken by other priorities, notwithstanding stated political will. For example, this can be seen in the case of DSC, which, despite its stated importance, was postponed to accommodate more immediate issues (domestic or otherwise). In this sense, counterintuitively speaking, it could be contended that the slow development of defence ties does not necessarily denote a high degree of distrust between Malaysia and China, but rather that defence diplomacy has not always been a high priority for the two sides.
Third, while Malaysia-China defence ties are ordinary, they are not static either. It is interesting to note that, even against the backdrop of growing security uncertainties in the South China Sea, Malaysia-China defence ties are gradually becoming closer. It shows that while the South China Sea issue generates strategic concerns in both countries, Malaysia is not closing the door of closer military ties. For example, in inviting China's South Sea Fleet to establish relations with Malaysia's Naval Command Region 2 in October 2013, Malaysia also signalled that, notwithstanding the South China Sea problem, the development of defence relations with China overall serves the two countries' mutual interests and Malaysia is willing to enhance these ties even further. As remarked to the author by a Malaysian military officer:
There is a big change in the attitude and behavior of the Chinese; they have more confidence today, and we need to know them and understand them better. It is important to continue to have confidencebuilding measures, and not to let them have the feeling of animosity. It is important to continue to engage with them, capitalize on their rhetoric on peace and make them committed to it.
Conclusion
This article has examined the development of Malaysia-China defence relations since the early 1990s. It has reviewed in detail the visits of senior defence officials of both countries, the exchange of military students, China's prospective arms sales to Malaysia, the defence and strategic dialogue and combined military exercises. Progress in Sino-Malaysian defence ties has been uneven. While mutual visits have been quite frequent, other areas of defence cooperation have developed rather slowly. For example, with a few exceptions, Chinese arms transfers to Malaysia have consistently failed to materialize despite years of talks, while the exchange of military students remains small in number, especially Chinese military students to Malaysia. Malaysia and China have only held two defence and security dialogues, and a field exercise between the two countries' armed forces will only take place in 2015. Moreover, in comparison with China's defence relations with other Southeast Asian countries, as well as Malaysia's defence relations with the United States, Malaysia-China defence relations do not appear to be exceptionally strong.
Nevertheless, this author argues against the interpretation that just because Malaysia-China defence relations have not proceeded at a faster pace, Malaysia-China relations must be somehow fraught with suspicions and strategic mistrust, and that the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is shallow. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is substantial because it is undergirded by economic relations rather than military ties. The slow development of defence ties may not necessarily arise from a high level of strategic distrust. Finally, while the South China Sea issue provides substantial strategic challenges to maintaining good ties between both countries, it has not prevented their armed forces from establishing relations and engaging with one another.
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